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Civil Disclosure and Freezing Orders:
Recovering Property from Overseas
Marvin G. Pickholz*

James Bernard**
I.

Introduction'
The prevailing emphasis at this Symposium is on the use of treaties,

the Hague Conventions on Taking Evidence or Service of Process,'
letters rogatory, mutual legal assistance treatises, memoranda of
understanding between nations and the forfeiture laws of the United
States and other nations.
Frequently, in the context of the United States, foreign litigants,
both governmental and private parties, overlook the far broader, more
easily invoked and utilized civil rules of procedure and civil process.
These civil rules are available to foreign litigants and tribunals through
direct application and use.
No letters rogatory, no treaty provisions, no assistance from the
U.S. government are required for "any interested person" to invoke

these rules and to ask a U.S. federal court to appoint someone chosen by
the applicant to conduct discovery of documents., take testimony from
individuals, or prosecute an action for recovery of assets and property to
satisfy foreign judgments.
Most important, a proceeding need not be "pending" in the foreign
court. The only requirement is that the evidence gathered be for use in
a foreign proceeding that is imminent or likely to commence in the near
future. U.S. civil proceedings, properly utilized, can be a fast track-a

*Partner and Head of White Collar Crime Group of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, a New York
law firm with offices throughout the United States and Budapest, Hungary.
**Summer Associate at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, New York.
1. The legal system in the United States consists of both a federal and a state level ofjudiciary
proceedings. The federal level, absent a definitive ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, often
produces decisions and rulings that vary between the thirteen U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals and,
within the Circuits, may differ among the lesser federal district courts. Likewise, the laws of the
50 sovereign states vary. Therefore, this article is designed to provide general, overall information
and is not intended to be, nor should it be, relied upon as definitive legal advice with regard to any
particular case.
2. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Criminal Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444; Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Criminal Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S.
No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
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super highway-to the result that more formalistic avenues may slow to

the pace of an evening rush hour in a major city.
This article will discuss several of these rules and will describe
other related procedures for discovery, freezing of assets, and recovery
of property in the United States.
II. Foreign Discovery: Section 1782 of the Judicial Procedure Code

Litigants in nations outside the United States [hereinafter foreign
litigants] can take advantage of the liberal discovery procedures available
to litigants in the United States without the burdens of lengthy procedures
and bureaucratic rules. In 1964, Congress passed a series of laws to

"improve judicial procedures for serving documents, obtaining evidence,
and proving documents in litigation with international aspects . . .
The Chairman of the Commission responsible for the new laws stated
that the Commission hoped "that the initiative taken by the United States
in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to
adjust their procedures."4
As part of this omnibus legislation, Congress amended section 1782
of the Judicial Code to the U.S. Code.' Section 1782 provides foreign

litigants with a means of obtaining evidence in the United States for use
in foreign proceedings. Unlike the more formal procedures associated

3. S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
4. Id. at 3794.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988). Section 1782 provides:
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a
letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the
applicationof any interestedperson and may direct that testimony or statement be given,
or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointedby the court. By
virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary
oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and
procedure, which may be in whole or in part the practiceand procedure of theforeign
country or the internationaltribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing
the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise,
the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily
giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other thing, for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner
acceptable to him.
Id. (emphasis added).
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with the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence,6 section 1782 provides
a far less cumbersome procedure for obtaining evidence in the United
States.' Indeed, as one court recently observed, "[t]he evolutionary.
process from the 1855 [version of section 1782] to the current
statutes .. . has generally been one of increasingly broad
applicability. "'
Although Congress, the courts and commentators all agree that
section 1782 was intended to provide foreign litigants with liberal access
to evidence in the United States, there is some disagreement on specific
aspects of the statutory scheme. The next part of this paper, after
describing the general contours of the statutes, addresses these open
issues. 9
A. What are the General Contours of Section 1782?
Section 1782 allows foreign litigants to obtain either oral or tangible
evidence located in the United States for use in a "proceeding in a
foreign or internationaltribunal."10 The statute provides three means
by which a foreign litigant can obtain evidence. First, the traditional
Second, a
process of obtaining a letter rogatory may be utilized."
"request" may be made by a foreign or international tribunal.12 Third,
and most notably, "any interested person" may make a direct
"application" to a district court 3 in which the desired evidence may be
found.' 4 This latter feature of section 1782 significantly lessens the

6. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. pmbl.
7. Brian Eric Bomstein &Julie M. Levitt, MuchAdo About 1782: A Look at Recent Problems
With Discovery in the United Statesfor Use in ForeignLitigation Under 28 U.S. C. § 1782, 20 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 433 (1989).
8. In re Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). See also In re Letter Rogatory from the
Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1975) (tracing history and
purpose of the predecessor statutes to section 1782).
9. See generally Morris H. Deutsch,-JudicialAssistance: ObtainingEvidence in the United
States Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Use in a Foreign or InternationalTribunal, 5 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 175 (1982).

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)(emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The U.S. federal court system is divided into three levels. At the highest level is the U.S.
Supreme Court. Below the Supreme Court are 13 circuits, 11 of which are numbered one through
eleven, and the other two are the District of Colombia Circuit and the Federal Circuit. In each
circuit is a Court of Appeals, hereinafter referred to as, for example, the "Eleventh Circuit". Each
circuit is also comprised of trial courts called District Courts. A circuit may contain more than one
district, in which case the districts are further divided by geographical location (e.g. the Southern
District of New York).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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burden a foreign litigant must bear in order to obtain evidence located in
the United States. While letter rogatories can still be submitted, a
foreign litigant is under no obligation to go through the tortured process
of obtaining one to derive the benefits of section 1782.
The statute does not provide any guidelines that a district court must
follow in deciding whether to grant a request. The district court is given
complete discretion. The legislative history, however, suggests the
following:
In exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into account
the nature and attitudes of the government of the country from which
the request emanates and the character of the proceedings in that
country, or in the case of proceedings before an international
tribunal, the nature of the tribunal and the character of the
proceedings before it. 5
This complete discretion has led to some of the disagreement in the
federal courts regarding under what circumstances the statute applies.
After a district court decides to grant the request, the court issues
an order directing that the appropriate evidence be obtained. 6 The
statute provides that either the court or a person appointed by the court
can supervise this process. 7 In addition, the court is given wide
latitude in prescribing the process by which the evidence is obtained. 8
The court can mandate that the rules governing the procedure, for
gathering the evidence shall be either the rules of the foreign litigation,
the federal rules of civil procedure, or any combination thereof.' 9 In
short, the court can be given "complete discretion" to determine the
appropriate manner in which to obtain the requested evidence." °

15. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3788. Although this language seems to suggest that
district courts should consider granting requests only to litigants from foreign countries that have
foreign assistance statutes similar to section 1782, this is not the case. See, e.g., In re Application
of Maley Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Congress intended... that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 would provide an avenue for judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals whether
or not reciprocal agreements existed."), cer. denied sub nom., United Technologies Int'l v. Maley
Hungarian Airlines, _ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992); John Deere Limited v. Sperry Corp., 754
F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that the purpose behind section 1782 was to stimulate
reciprocity and holding that while this does not prohibit a court from giving absence of reciprocity
"some consideration in the exercise of its discretionary power," it does not "require reciprocity as
a predicate to the grant of a discovery order").
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3789.
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B. Must the ForeignLitigation be Pending?
An ongoing source of controversy is whether a foreign proceeding
must be pending at the time a request for evidence is made to a district
court. The language of the statute before the 1964 amendments provided
that evidence could only be used "for use in any judicial proceeding
pending in any court ... "21 Notably, the 1964 amendments deleted
the word "pending".'
Thus, as the Reporter to the Commission that
drafted the amendments noted, "it is not necessary . . . for the
proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but only that
the evidence is eventually to be used .
,,3 The issue becomes,
therefore, how eventual the proceeding before a district court can grant
the request.
The Eleventh Circuit, the first court to directly address this issue,
held that a "district judge should satisfy himself that a proceeding is very
likely to occur."' The court did not want section 1782 to become a
vehicle for fishing expeditions or harassment.'
This standard was subsequently adopted by the Second Circuit.26
The court, while noting the Reporter's27 comment that the evidence
must "eventually" be used, repeatedly emphasized that this was not
enough.'
Notably, the appellate court reversed the district court's
adoption of a standard whereby requests would be granted whenever a
proceeding was "probable."29 In sum, the court reasoned:
Though we will not insist that proceedings be "pending," we think it
prudent, in the absence of any indication as to why Congress deleted
the word "pending" and in view of the distinct possibility that the
deletion might have been inadvertent, to require that adjudicative
proceedings be imminent-very likely to occur and soon to occur.'

21. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (emphasis added).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
23. Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1015, 1026 (1965) (emphasis added).
24. In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1156 (1 1th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989) (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. In re Request for International Judicial Assistance for the Federative Republic of Brazil,
936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
27. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28. FederativeRepublic of Brazil, 936 F.2d at 705-07.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 706.
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Although the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by then Judge Ginsburg
(and now U.S. Supreme Court Justice), cited with approval to the
decision in the Eleventh Circuit, the court held "that judicial proceedings
in a tribunal must be within reasonable contemplation"." According
to the Second Circuit, the difference between "reasonable contemplation"
and "very likely to occur" is more than semantics. The Second Circuit
noted this difference and opined that the former standard is "more
relaxed" than the latter. 32 Nonetheless, a case in which a foreign
proceeding was within "reasonable contemplation" but not "very likely
to occur" has yet to arise. The Second Circuit's comment, rather than
suggesting that the two standards are distinct, may have simply been a
means of emphasizing its view that the proceeding must be imminent.
C. Is Discoverabilityof the Requested Evidence in the Foreign
Country a Prerequisiteto Obtaining Evidence in the United States?
An issue that has more directly divided the federal courts is whether
a finding that the requested evidence would be discoverable pursuant to
the laws of the foreign litigation is necessary before a section 1782
request can be granted. 3 One line of cases holds that such a finding is
a prerequisite to the issuance of an order. A second line of cases holds
that while this is an issue a district court may consider in reaching its
decision, it is not a sine qua non.
The Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that "[w]hile a district court
generally should not decide whether the requested evidence will be
admissible in the foreign court, the district court must decide whether the
evidence would be discoverable in the foreign country before granting
assistance. "I The court did not discuss its reasons for this view and
its reliance on two decisions in other courts has been severly criticized. 5
31. In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870
F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
32. Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706.
33. See generally Lawrence A. Newman & Michael Burrows, U.S. Discovery for Foreign
Litigants, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1994, at 2.
34. Trinidadand Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156 (citing John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d
132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985)); In re Court of the Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South
Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
35. See In re Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 4431
(1993). Interestingly enough, in the decision in the District of Colombia Circuit, then Judge
Ginsburg cites language in both Trinidad and Tobago and John Deere that stands for the proposition
that evidence must be discoverable in a foreign country before it can be obtained under section 1782.
See In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d
686, 693 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Appellants in Gianoli cited Crown Prosecution as a case in which
a court had held that discoverability was necessary. The Gianoli court, however, reasoned that in
Crown Prosecution these two cases were cited not to establish the existence of a discoverability

RECOVERING PROPERTY FROM OVERSEAS

The First Circuit, reversing a district court decision to the contrary,
also held that evidence sought in the United States must be discoverable
under the laws of the foreign country.36 The court cited the decision
in the Eleventh Circuit, but explored the underlying policy issues in
greater detail. 7 First, the court was concerned that a U.S. litigant
in a foreign country with limited pre-trial discovery will be placed at
a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis the foreign party. All the foreign
party need do is file a request for assistance under section 1782 and
the floodgates are open for unlimited discovery while the United
States party is confined to restricted discovery in a foreign
jurisdiction.3"
Second, the court did not want the foreign litigants to be able to use
section 1782 to "circumvent foreign law and procedures."" The court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to place itself on a
collision course with foreign tribunals and legislatures that have carefully
chosen the procedures and laws best suited for their concepts of
litigation.'
The Second Circuit declined to follow the holdings of these two
courts and explicitly held that "section 1782 does not contain a
requirement. that the material requested in the district court be
discoverable under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction."41 The court
criticized the reasoning of the First Circuit.42 The court focused on the
permissive language in the applicable legislative history43 and the clear
statement contained therein that section 1782 "leaves the issuance of an
appropriate order to the discretion of the court

....

,4" In addition,

requirement, but rather in the context of a discussion regarding the appropriate evidence taking
procedures under section 1782. Gianoli, 3 F. 3d at 60 n. 1.
36. In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Fonden v.
Aldunate, _ U.S.
114 S.Ct. 443 (1993).
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id.
41. Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 62. Two recent decisions in the Southern District of New York have
interpreted this rule. See In re Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 84 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting 1782
application as an "unwarranted intrusion" into French law); In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp.
695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting 1782 application because applicant had not obtained approval from
arbitrator as required by foreign law). These decisions indicate that while the Second Circuit has
rejected a discoverability rule, foreign law is not irrelevant to a decision under sectoin 1782.
42. Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 60.
43. Id. at 59 (citing In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., United Technologies Int'l v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, _ U.S. _, 113
S. Ct. 179 (1992)).
44. Id. at 60 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3788).
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the court noted the overall liberalizing features of the 1964
amendments.45 According to the Second Circuit, these three factors
indicate that
[wihile district judges may well find that in appropriate cases a
determination of discoverability under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction is a useful tool in their exercise of discretion under
section 461782, . . . no such threshold requirement exists in the
statute.
D. What is a "Foreignor InternationalTribunal"?
Prior to the 1964 amendments, section 1782 provided that assistance
from a U.S. court was only available when evidence was to be used in
a foreign "court." The amendments changed the word "court" to
"tribunal" so as to reflect the growth of administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings all over the world . ... I Congress intended to "make it
clear that assistance is not confined to the proceedings before
conventional courts."" As is often the case, however, the path from
congressional intent to judicial practice is paved with ambiguity and
uncertainty. In the cases at the margins, courts have struggled to
determine clearly and consistently whether a given proceeding is before
a "tribunal" within the meaning of section 1782." 9
In an early decision by the late eminent Judge Henry Friendly of the
Second Circuit, the court was called upon to decide whether the Indian
Income-Tax Office was a tribunal under section 1782.1 According to
the Supreme Court of India, the accessors in the Office "are
administrative authorities whose proceedings are regulated by statute, but
whose function is to estimate the income of the taxpayer and to assess
him to tax on the basis of that estimate . . . [T]he proceeding [does not
have] the character of an action between the citizen and the State. "'
In holding that the Office was not a proper tribunal, Judge Friendly,
reasoned that section 1782

45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. at 60.
47. See generally Bruce L. McDaniel, What is a Foreign "Tribunal" Within 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 1782 (As Amended in 1964) For Use in Which a District Court May Issue Discovery Orders in
Response to Letters Rogatory, 46 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1980).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Letters of Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India,
385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
51. Id. at 1020.
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is not so broad as to include all of the plethora of administrators
whose decisions affect private parties and who are not entitled to act
arbitrarily, and one useful guideline is the absence of any degree of
separation between the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. 2
This lack of separation is an indication of "an institutional interest in a
particular result [ ]'53 and that a particular proceeding is not a tribunal

within the meaning of section 1782.
Almost thirteen years after this decision, the Second Circuit turned
to Judge Friendly's reasoning to decide whether the office of the
Superintendent of Exchange Control of the Republic of Columbia was a
tribunal within the meaning of section

17 8 2 .*

The court again focused

on the adjudicatory nature and impartiality of the Superintendent's
functions. The Superintendent was "charged to act in the government's
interest to enforce the law. .

.

. He has extraordinary powers to order

and conduct far-reaching investigations. Upon completion of his
investigation, he is empowered to determine whether violation of the law
has occurred."" Based upon these functions, the court held that the
Superintendent had an "institutional interest" that was "inconsistent with
the concept of impartial adjudication intended by the term 'tribunal.' "56
A district court in California adopted similar reasoning in holding
that the Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada was not a tribunal
within the meaning of section 1782.' 7 The Manitoba Court was
empowered to "inquire into, ascertain and report upon . . . facts and
In
circumstances . . . [and] to make recommendations . . . . ""

contrast, the court held that section 1782 was intended to apply only to
"foreign bo[dies that] exercise adjudicative power and have an
adjudicativepurpose". In sum,
[tihe legislative history does not indicate. . . that it was the purpose
of Congress or the Administration to broaden the scope of
international cooperation beyond the activities of courts and other

52. Id. at 1021.
53. Id. at 1020.
54. Fonesca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. 734 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 882. See also In re Letters of Request from the Government of
France, 139 F.R.D. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the holdings of In re India and Fonesca as
they apply a juge d'instruction of the Court of Higher Instance of Paris).
55. Fonesca, 620 F.2d at 323-24.
56. Id.
57. In re Letter of Request to Examine Witnesses From the Court of Queen's Bench for
Manitoba Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 629.
59. Id. (emphasis added).

13

DIcK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1995

quasi-judicial entities to encompass bodies whose primary functions
are investigative. 6
These decisions appear to focus on at least two factors in deciding
whether a given foreign body is a tribunal. The Second Circuit has
historically examined the impartiality of the proceeding and the Eleventh
Circuit has focused on the degree to which the foreign body is engaged
in the investigatory work. Given the lack of definition or guidance in the
statute and legislative history, these factors are far from exclusive. As
such, courts will continue to refine the terms of the debate as more cases
arise.
E. Summary
In spite of occassional disagreement and ambiguous statutory
terminology, it is clear that Congress amended section 1782 to provide
a liberal framework for assisting foreign litigants. The courts are
attempting to devise a standard within that framework for deciding
whether to grant a given request. The disagreements, in some respects,
are driven by the lack of any clearly enunciated congressional standard.
The standards created by the courts, although varying slightly from
circuit to circuit, are consistent with the overall liberalizing nature of the
1964 amendments.
Foreign litigants, including foreign governments
should not hesitate to invoke section 1782 where a case is pending or is
reasonably foreseable to the immediate future, in a foreign tribunal.
III. Alternative Discovery Procedures: Section 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code and Section 21(a)(2) of The Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934
Although section 1782 is by far the most frequently invoked means
of obtaining evidence in the United States, other methods exist. For
example, section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, discussed in greater detail
below, allows a foreign litigant to commence a proceeding in the United
States ancillary to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. The court in which
this ancillary proceeding is brought can, among others, "order other
appropriate relief. "61
In a case before the Southern District of Texas, on appeal from
bankrupcty court, a Trustee in a Canadian bankruptcy commenced 62a
section 304 proceeding to obtain evidence located in the United States.

60.
61.
62.

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (1988).
Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 B.R. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
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In affirming the district the bankruptcy court's order, the district court,
noting that no other court had addressed the issue, reasoned that
[tihe scope of section 304 as seen in the language of the statute and
its legislative history is broad and flexible enough to allow for an
ancillary suit to be filed for the purpose of discovery. Allowing
discovery will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of [this] estate, consistent with ... comity.63
Notably, appellants argued that the Trustee should have sought discovery
through section 1782. The court, however, rejected this argument and
held that section 1782 "does not preclude other methods of
discovery".'
Another example of an alternative means of obtaining evidence
located in the United States, while not for private litigants, can be found
in section 21(a)(2) of The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.65
Adopted by amendment in 1988, this section authorizes the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to provide assistance to
foreign securities authorities.' The SEC may comply with the request
"without regard to whether the facts stated in the request would also
constitute a violation of the laws of the United States".67 The statute
only requires the SEC to consider whether (1) the requesting authority
provides reciprocal assistance and (2) the requested assistance would
"prejudice the public interest of the United States".6
In a recent letter to the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, the SEC's Director of
International Affairs commented on the experience of the SEC with
section 21(a)(2). 61 The Director stated that section 21(a)(2), much like
section 1782, "provided a powerful incentive for foreign authorities to
seek similar legislation that could be used to assist the SEC. "7o Indeed,
according to the Director, legislation similar to section 21(a)(2) is now
in force in at least seven countries.71 In addition, the SEC has fifteen
63. Id. at 419 (quoting I1 U.S.C. § 304(c)). Other courts, while not citing this decision, have
allowed a section 304 petitioner to obtain discovery under section 304. See, e.g., In re Brierley,
145 B.R. 151, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891, 898-99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
64. Angulo, 29 B.R. at 410.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-80(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
66. Id. § 78(u)(a)(2).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Letter from Michael D. Mann to Diane P. Wood, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,860 at
78552 (June 13, 1994).
70. Id.
71. Id. The Director cited the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Japan, Australia,
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Memoranda of Understanding with foreign regulatory agencies that
provide a framework for the exchange of information.72 Overall, the
Director believes that section 21(a)(2) "has greatly enhanced the
regulator's ability to carry out its enforcement function by making it
more difficult to hide behind the borders of another jurisdiction to avoid
detection and prosecution of offenses.""
A. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Freeze Orders & Recovery
of Property
The Bankruptcy Code, much like many other areas of U.S. law, has
been influenced by the internationalization of business and finance. The
failure of a large West German commercial bank, Bankhaus LD. Hestatt,
in 1974 made clear the extent to which insolvencies are no longer
confined to national borders. This bank failure, and the resulting
international search for assets, has been cited as one of the reasons
Congress added section 304 to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 74
Section 304 was intended "to prevent piecemeal distribution of
assets in the United States by means of legal proceedings initiated in
domestic courts by local creditors."" It allows an appropriate foreign
representative to a foreign bankruptcy to bring an ancillary action in the
U.S. court. 6 Prior to the enactment of section 304, while a foreign

Mexico, and certain provinces of Canada.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 78,553.
74. Terri P. Finister, Comment, 1989 Developments and the Conflicts Arising Under Section
304, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 345, 345-46 (1989); Anne Norby Nielsen, Comment, Section 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Has itFostered the Development of an "InternationalBankruptcy System"?, 22
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541, 547-48 (1984).
75. In re Koreang, Controle Et RevisionS.A., 961 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied
U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 188 (1992).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988). This section provides:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does
not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may:
(1) - enjoin the commencement or continuation of:
(A) any action against(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such
foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with
respect to such property, or any act or the commencement or
continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or to enforce
a lien against the property of such estate.
(2) order the turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such
property, to such foreign representative; or
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representative could not tecnically bring a bankruptcy case in the United
States, U.S. courts recognized the rights of foreign representatives under
the doctrine of comity."' Section 304 codifies this practice and defines
its scope and boundaries. In an oft-quoted passage from an early case,
a district court reasoned that section 304 allows the courts "to broadly
mold appropriate relief in near blank check fashion . . . ." According
to the legislative history accompanying section 304, the guidelines of the
statute are
designed to give the court maximum flexibility in handling ancillary
cases ... [Tihe court [is] permitted to make the appropriate orders
under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being
provided with inflexible rules.79
The transition from this clear intent to give the courts broad
flexibility to application of the statute to specific instances has not always
been one of clarity and precision. The flexible rules sometimes lead to
inconsistent results. The next part of this paper explores the structure of
section 304 and some of the issues that have arisen in its interpretation.
B. Section 304: General Contours
A section 304 proceeding does not create a full bankruptcy case, as
an estate is not created. 8 Rather, it allows a U.S. bankruptcy court to
order appropriate relief ancillary to a full bankruptcy case litigated in a
foreign country. As a threshold matter, a section 304 ancillary can only
be brought when a "foreign proceeding" has commenced and only upon
application of a "foreign representative"." These seemingly innocuous

(c)

77.
78.
79.
5821.
80.
81.

(3) order other appropriate relief.
In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court
shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of such estate, consistent with
(1) just treatment of holders of claims against or interests in such estates;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the
order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
2 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLUIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 304.2 (1991).
In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
S. REp. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785,
See 2 KING, supra note 77, § 304.01.
11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988).
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terms have, as will be discussed below, led to some confusion over who
may bring a section 304 proceeding and when it may be brought.
Assuming that these threshold criteria have been met, section 304
allows a court to grant three forms of relief:
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of any action, the
enforcement of any judgment and the creation or enforcement of any
lien, againstproperty involved in aforeign proceeding or againsta
debtor with respect to such property; (2) order turnover of the
property of the foreign estate, or proceeds of such property, to the
foreign representative; or (3) "order other appropriate relief."'
In deciding whether to grant this relief, a court must consider the
six factors enumerated in section 304(c). However, these factors only
serve as guideposts that a court is free to balance as a given case
demands. In addition, some of the factors are at odds with each other.
One commentator has even gone so far as to say:
The factors listed in Section 304(c) provide a morass of internally
inconsistent and redundant principles. Not suprisingly, a workable
standard in which requests for relief may be evaluated has simply not
been devised.83
Inclusion of the word "debtor" in the definition of "foreign proceeding"
is the source of the controversy. Sections 101(13) and 109 of the
bankruptcy code, respectively, define the word "debtor"' and establish
"[w]ho may be a debtor[.]" 85 Both sections use the word "person."
"Person" is defined in section 101(41).86 The issue is whether sections
101(13), 101(41), and 109 apply to section 304. That is, whether the
definition of debtor contained in the Bankruptcy Code controls under
what circumstance a section 304 proceeding may be brought.
Early cases seemed willing to apply section 109(a) to section 304.'
Indeed, the language of section 109(a) seemed to compel such a
result.8 8 This willingness may have been because section 109(a) was

82. 2 KING, supra note 77, § 304.03 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (1988)). In addition to
the relief available under section 304, two other sections of the Bankruptcy Code provide related
forms of relief: (1) section 303 allows a foreign representative to file an involuntary case; and (2)
section 305 allows a foreign representative to seek dismissal or suspension of a case. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 303, 305 (1988).
83. Nielson, supra note 74, at 559.
84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(13) (West Supp. 1994).
85. Id. § 109.
86. Id. § 101(41).
87. See generally Finister, supra note 74, at 351-52 n.47; 2 KING, supra note 77, § 304.02.
88. 2 KING, supra note 77, § 109.02.
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not seen as restricting the ability to bring ancillary proceedings and it
therefore was not in conflict with the broad equity purposes of section
304. Once the restrictive nature of section 109(a) was at issue, however,
and the result of a case turned on this issue, courts were forced to
directly address the problem. In these instances, the courts backed away
from the earlier cases and did not apply section 109(a) to section 304.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit confronted this issue when a
foreign decedent left property abroad and in the United States." The
decedent's liabilities exceeded his assets by some $55 million.'
A
foreign court appointed an administrator to oversee both the domestic and
foreign assets." At the same time, however, a Georgia court appointed
an administrator to oversee the assets located in Georgia. 2 The foreign
representative attempted to enjoin the probate proceeding in Georgia by
filing a section 304 petition in bankruptcy court.9
The bankruptcy
court denied the petition holding that an insolvent decedent's estate did
not qualify as a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Code.' The district
court affirmed and on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court of appeals
reversed. 95
The court of appeals agreed with a long line of cases that held that
an insolvent decedent's estate did not qualify as a "debtor" under the
code, but disagreed with the lower courts that such a finding prohibited
the bankruptcy court from entertaining a section 304 petition. 96 The
court focused on an apparent anomaly:
[A]lthough the inclusion of the term "debtor" in the definition of
"foreign proceeding" suggests that the subject of the foreign
proceeding must qualify as a "debtor" under U.S. bankruptcy law,
the Code expressly provides that theforeign proceedingneed not even
be a bankruptcy proceeding, either under foreign or United States
law. Moreover, "foreign proceeding" includes a proceeding "for the
purpose of liquidating an estate"-yet, as we have seen, a decedent's
estate does not qualify as a "debtor" under United States bankruptcy
law. 97

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Goerg v. Parunago, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1034 (1989).
Id. at 1563.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pairunago, 844 F.2d at 1564.
Id. at 1564, 1568.
Id. at 1566.
Id. at 1566-67 (emphasis added).
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This tangled mass of interlocking and seemingly contradictory
statutory provisions left the court in a quagmire. The stable ground upon
which the court based its holding was a "well-established canon of
statutory construction."' Namely, "that '[a] statute susceptible of more
than one meaning must be read in the manner which effectuates rather
than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen.' "" The
court noted the clear intent of Congress "to help further the efficiency of
Also, the court reasoned that
foreign insolvency proceedings . . . ."
"in light of the comity concerns that induced Congress to enact section
304, it would make eminent sense for Congress to define expansively the
class of foreign insolvency proceedings for which ancillary assistance is
available. "101 For these reasons, the court held that a "debtor need
only be properly subject, under applicable foreign law, to a proceeding
commenced 'for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by
composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization.'""
The insolvency of the late Robert Maxwell in In re Brierly created
another situation in which a court confronted this issue. 3 The case
was handled by Bankruptcy Judge Tina L. Bozman in the Southern
District of New York in 1992. In an odd twist of fate, Judge Bozman
had written an opinion seventeen years earlier" that had come to be
relied upon for the proposition that the Bankruptcy Code determined
whether a debtor was qualified to bring a section 304 proceeding. 5
This earlier proposition, however, was only dicta, and Judge Bozman,
addressing the issue directly in the Brierly litigation, reached the exact
opposite conclusion. In the Brierly litigation, the court reasoned that
since a foreign representative does not commence a full bankruptcy
proceeding under section 304, it would be inappropriate to require that
a foreign representative qualify as a "debtor" under the Code. 0 6
Because of this, "most of the perceived lack of clarity in the statutory
Noting, however, that this creates a
provisions evaporates.""' 7
situation where the world "debtor" has two different meanings, one

98. Id. at 1567.
99. Parunago, 844 F.2d at 1567 (quoting Schultz v. Louisiana Trailer Sales, Inc., 428 F.2d
61, 65 (5thCir.), cert. deniedsub. nom. Louisiana TrailerSalesv. Hodgson, 400 U.S. 902 (1970)).
100. Id. at 1568.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (1988)).
103. In re Brierly, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
104. See In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
105. See, e.g., In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (in dicta, citing In re Gee for
this proposition).
106. Brierly, 145 B.R. at 159-60.
107. Id. at 160.
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under section 304 and the other under the rest of the Bankruptcy Code,
the court followed the Eleventh Circuit and looked to the purpose behind
section 304."°8 Examining the legislative history in the same light as
the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that this difference was not fatal. In
a further twist to this case, the court cited a Second Circuit decisions
regarding section 1782 to support its holding." ° The court reasoned:
Reading together 11 U.S.C. § 304 and 28 U.S.C. § 1782 one cannot
doubt that Congress meant to aid foreign tribunals, be the
proceedings before them bankruptcies or litigations. If a litigant can
take discovery in the United States just for the asking, there is no
sensible reason to impose a requirement that a foreign representative
seeking discovery [under section 304] must first prove that a foreign
debtor could have been a debtor under our laws." 0
C. How Does a Court Determine, Pursuantto Section 304(c),
Whether to Grant Requested Relief?
The statutory factors that a court must consider under section
304(c), in providing great flexibility, also create a great deal of
uncertainty. Complete discretion is a powerful tool. Results will vary
greatly depending on any number of unanticipated considerations.
Having said this, however, a review of a few decisions can provide a
sense of the issues courts frequently find most significant.
1. The role of comity.-Priorto the passage of section 304, courts
focused on comity"' in deciding whether to defer to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings."
Section 304(c), however, lists six factors
for a court to consider.113 This tension between tradition and flexible
guidelines has created an ongoing debate in some of the federal courts

108. Id.
109. See id. (discussing In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub. nom. United Technologies Int'l v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 113 S. Ct. 179
(1992)).
110. Id.
111. In the most frequently cited case for the definition of comity, the Supreme Court defined
it as:
[T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guvot, 159 U.S. 113, 114 (1895).
112. Finister, supra note 74, at 350-51.
113. See supra note 76 for the text of § 304(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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regarding the weight that should be given to the comity factor in section
304(c)(5).
A series of bankruptcy court cases in the Southern District of New
York have explored this issue. The earliest case in the district to address
the issue reasoned that "[a]ll of the factors listed in Section 304(c) have
historically been considered within a district court's determination
whether to afford comity to a proceeding in a foreign nation."114
Although this view of comity, which can be termed the incorporation
view, seems to reason that the other factors in section 304 are part of the
traditional comity analysis, this case has come to stand for the
proposition that comity is the most important factor." 5
Shortly after this decision, another bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of New York more explicitly held that "[a]lthough comity is only
one of six factors to be considered in determining whether to grant relief,
it often will be the most significant, . . . where it serves as the crux of
debtor's argument.""16 This reading of the statute views comity as a
distinct factor among the six factors in section 304(c).
Perhaps these two views were harmonized by another recent
bankruptcy decision in the Southern District of New York. Analyzing
these prior cases, the court held:
While it is true that neither the code nor its legislative history
explicitly require that comity be afforded more weight than the other
section 304(c) factors, neither does it provide that all of the factors
must be given equal weight. Comity is inevitably the more
significant factor since the other factors (except for the sixth element
dealing with the fresh start theory) are inherently taken into account
when considering comity."'
Although this passage explicitly holds that comity is the "more
significant factor", it also seems to imply what logic should dictate. If
the other factors are "inherently taken into account" in a comity analysis,
then it makes little difference to say that comity is the most significant
factor because a comity analysis, by definition, entails consideration of
the other factors.

114. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
115. See infra notes 116, 117 and accompanying text.
116. Gee, 53 B.R. at 901.
117. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705, 712 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied __ U.S. __
113 S. Ct. 188
(1992).
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Nonetheless, at least one other court has specifically rejected the
notion that comity is the most significant factor."' Presumably, a
court, by rejecting comity as the most significant factor, must believe
that the other statutory factors are not being given due weight in an
analysis that focuses on issues of comity. 9 Perhaps the court was
concerned with the view expressed in some Southern District cases that
exceptions to the doctrine of comity should be narrowly construed where
the foreign proceeding is in a "sister common law jurisdiction with
proceedings akin to our own.""
2. Analyzing Foreign Bankruptcy Law. -To provide a more
concrete basis upon which to understand how the various section 304(c)
This
factors apply, it is useful to examine some competing cases.'
part of the article examines decisions in which courts have and have not
allowed a foreign reprsentative to bring an ancillary proceeding.
In an early case from the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District
of Michigan, the court refused to grant a trustee's application for a
proceeding ancillary to a bankruptcy proceeding in Canada."z The
Trustee's sought to enjoin all creditors from commencing any action
Hesse, the domestic party opposed to the
against the debtor."
motion, had won an arbitration award against a foreign debtor that was
affirmed by a state court and had served writs of garnishments on the
debtor. "
Under U.S. law, Hesse was a lien creditor with a secured
claim. Under section 304(c)(4), the distribution of the proceeds from the
debtor's estate would not be "'substantially in accordance with the order
The Trustee argued
prescribed by [the U.S. Bankruptcy Code].'' l
that comity should dictate that the court stay the arbitration award
pending resolution of the Canadian bankruptcy proceedings. The court,
however, disagreed, reasoning that the courts "must protect'United States

118. See In re Papeleras, 92 B.R. 584, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[Ilt is best to consider
all of the variables of § 304(c) in determining the appropriate relief in an ancillary proceeding.").
119. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (discussed infra notes
122-26 and accompanying text).
120. See Gee, 53 B.R. at 901.
121. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, a number of other cases have addressed
this issue. See, e.g., In re Papelaras, 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (addressing Spanish law
and dismissing an ancillary proceeding); In re Banco do Descuento, 78 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1987) (discussing Ecudorian law and granting limited section 304 relief).
122. In re Toga Manfg., Ltd., 28 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
123. Id. at 162.
124. Id. at 164.
125. Id. at 169 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (1988)).
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citizens' claims against foreign judgments inconsistent with this country's
well-defined and accepted policies. "126
Similar reasoning was adopted by a district court in New
Jersey.12 7
A creditor of a debtor shipping company filed an
involuntary liquidation proceeding in Australia and a Liquidator was
appointed. The debtor had some property in the United States. The
Liquidator filed a section 304 petition seeking to administer the U.S.
assets under the umbrella of Australian bankruptcy law. The court
denied the petition. While the court noted that "[tihere is no requirement
that Australian law and the United States law be identical[,]"12 the
court held that "[bloth the laws and the public policy of the United States
will be violated if the case is permitted to proceed under Australian
law."29 Specifically, the court was concerned about the (1) ex parte
nature of the winding up proceedings in Australia and (2) lack of
substantive remedy of equitable subordination of insider's claims."
Other cases have held that foreign law afforded U.S. creditors
adequate protection and have granted section 304 petitions. For
example, the bankruptcy laws of the Bahamas were held to be in
"substantial conformity with [United States law]. " 13'
The court
enumerated a number of aspects of Bahamian law that justified this
holding.'32 These aspects included: (1) significant oversight of the
winding-up proceedings by the Bahamas Supreme Court; (2) distribution
of the estate in substantial similarity with the order and priorities
prescribed by the Bankdrupty Code; and (3) notice and other reporting
requirements. The court reasoned that "[w]hether or not Bahamian law
is identical in application to American law, there is nothing inherently
wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing American moral sense in

126. Id. at 170. This case has been the subject of much criticism, both by commentators and
thejudiciary. See In re Axona Int'l, 88 B.R. 597, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Cornfeld v. Investors
Oversees Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (affording comity to Canadian winding
up procedures not on the basis of section 304, but on the basis that the procedures are consistent
with those of the United States), aff'd 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), cited with approval in In re
Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (section 304 case). As addressed below, the modern
trend, particularly in the Second Circuit, has been to grant section 304 petitions on a much lower
burden of similarity than the court in Toga was willing to tolerate.
127. Interpool Ltd. v. KKL PTY Ltd., 102BR. 373 (D.N.J. 1988), appealdismissed, 878 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 378 (citing In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
129. Id. at 378-80.
130. Id. at 378-80.
131. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629.
132. Id. at 629.
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[Bahamian law]. ""'- In support of this position, the court pointed out
that Bahamian law was based on the English Companies Act.
In a case in which the primary bankruptcy proceeding was occuring
under British law, the Brierly litigation, the court explored this issue at
some length."3 The petition for an ancillary proceeding was "but one
component of a large, transnational bankruptcy."135 The court noted:
Lurking in all transnational bankruptcies is the potential for chaos if
the courts involved ignore the importance of comity. As anyone who
has made even a brief excursion into this area of insolvency practice
will report, there is little to guide practitioners or the judiciary in
dealing with the unique problems posed by such bankruptcies. Yet
it is critical to harmonize the proceedings in the different courts lest
decrees at war with one another result.' 36
Having so noted, however, the court went on to reason that "one cannot
simply 'feel' that comity is warranted. So we turn to a comparison of
British and American insolvency law
. . "37
After taking notice of
the sharing of a common law tradition and the long history of granting
comity to proceedings in the United Kingdom,'38 the court extensively
surveyed British insolvency law. The court concluded: "Nothing
dictates that the foreign law be a carbon copy of our law; rather, the
[British] Insolvency Act must not be repugnant to American laws and
policies, which it manifestly is not.""''
In sum, section 304(c) creates a tension between protecting the
rights of U.S. creditors and giving deference to foreign proceedings."
In balancing these frequently competing concerns, courts will look to
both the overall structure of the foreign law and the specific factual
scenario a given case presents. Overall, as some of the cases indicate,
the modern trend is to grant section 304 petitions under a much lower
showing of similarity than early section 304 cases adopted.

133. Id. at 631.
134. Brierly, 145 B.R. at 151.
135. Id. at 164.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 162 n.5.
139. Brierly, 145 B.R. at 151.
140. See generally Nielsen, supranote 74, at 560-73 (discussing difference betweenuniversality,
including all creditors in one proceeding, and pluralism, giving primary emphasis to the needs of
local creditors, in terms of section 304 cases).
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D. Summary
In holding that the debtor in a foreign proceeding need not meet the
statutory definition of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, and instead
need only qualify as a debtor under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction,
courts are expanding the availability of section 304. Similarly, by taking
a more international approach to transnational insolvencies under section
304(c), courts are expressing a desire to unify international insolvency
proceedings under one jurisdiction. The combination of these factors
indicate the development of a trend in favor of broad application of
section 304 relief.
IV. Recovery of Property
Foreign plaintiffs are often faced with a dual problem in today's
global business environment. First, defendents' assets are frequently
located in numerous places and defendants may try to move these assets
to avoid paying potentially adverse judgments. Second, after obtaining
a judgment in a foreign court, plaintiffs may find that judgment
impossible to enforce because defendants do not have any assets in the
foreign country. Two distinct but related provisions of New York law
and the law of many other States, provide a means of overcoming these
obstacles.
For the problem of movable assets, attachment proceedings,
available in all states under varying circumstances, allow a plaintiff to
prevent a defendant from shifting assets. Although frequently used to
establish jurisdiction over a defendant, attachment also serves a security
function by freezing assets pending judgment. Separate from this
process, a plaintiff with a foreign judgment can convert it into a New
York judgment and have it enforced by a New York court. Since the
process for converting a foreign judgment may take time, plaintiffs in
New York can move to attach assets on the grounds that a foreign
judgment has been rendered. The next part of this article examines the
procedures used to obtain these forms of relief and some of the more
significant issues surrounding their application.
A. Attachment
Article 62 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter
CPLR] governs the attachment procedure. Section
6201 lists five
141
grounds upon which an attachment may be granted.

141.

N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &R. LAW § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1994). Section 6201 provides:

RECOVERING PROPERTY FROM OVERSEAS

Assuming that an attachment may properly be made against a
defendant, section 6211 allows a plaintiff to make a motion for an order
of attachment ex parte.4
Depending on the grounds upon which this
attachment is made, plaintiff must move within either five or ten days
after the ex pane motion is granted to confirm the order of
attachment.' 4 3 Plaintiff must also notify defendant of the confirmation
hearing. In either an ex parte motion or a confirmation proceeding,
plaintiff must establish that: (1) There is a cause of action; (2) It is
probable plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (3) There are proper
grounds under section 6201 for the attachment; and (4) The amount
demanded from defendant exceeds all counterclaims known to
plaintiff.'" In addition, plaintiff must post a bond.4 5
1. Jurisdiction.-In any action before a court in the United States,
the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Since the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,'46 the ability of all courts to obtain in personam
jurisidction has been analyzed under the doctrine of minimum contacts.
In addition to the constitutional standard, each state has its own law
governing a state court's ability to obtain personal jurisdiction. A court
must have jurisdiction over a defendant under both state law and pursuant
to constitutional standards."' An attachment proceeding is not exempt

An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action, where
the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the
alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when:
1. the defendant is a nondomicillary residing without the state, or is a foreign
corporation not qualified to do business in the state; or
2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be personally
served despite diligent efforis to do so; or
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement
of a judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff's favor, has assigned, disposed of,
encumbered or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any
of these acts; or
5. the cause of action is based on a judgment, decree or order of a court of
the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit
in this state, or on a judgment which qualifies for recognition under the
provisions of article53 [Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments].
Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. § 6211(a).
143. Id. § 6211(b).
144. Id. § 6212(a).
145. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. LAw § 6212(b) (McKinney 1978).
146. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
147. There is, however, one important exception to this general rule. In 1993, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were amended. Rule 4, which governs service of process, was amended
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from these requirements, and under New York law, particularly for
foreign litigants, this analysis can often resemble a trip through the
looking glass and into a different legal world.
A recent decision by the highest court in New York state, the New
York Court of Appeals, provides an excellent example of the issues
involved.14 8 Plaintiff, an Italian banking corporation, loaned fifteen
million dollars to defendant, a Bahamian banking corporation. 49
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not repaid the loan."5 Neither
party was authorized to do business in New York. 5 ' The money
allegedly loaned to defendant was on deposit with defendant's
correspondent in New York.' 52 Plaintiff attempted to attach the money
on deposit with defendant's correspondent bank. 53 The issue was
whether a New York court, under these circumstances, could maintain
jurisdiction over defendant when plaintiff conceded lack of in personam
jurisdiction.
The roots of this problem have their origin in the doctrine of quasiin-rem jurisdiction. Prior to another landmark Supreme Court decision,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 4 a court that did not have in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant could obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction if the defendant
had any property located within the state in which the proceeding was to
take place. Shaffer significantly changed, if not eliminated, this basis for
obtaining jurisdiction. Basically, Shaffer held that the mere presence of
property within a state is an insufficient basis upon which to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant. Applying the teachings of International
Shoe, the Shaffer court held that the same minimum contacts analysis
necessary to sustain in personam jurisdiction applies to quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction.
Although this would appear to eliminate the usefulness of quasi-inrem jurisdiction, because minimum contacts necessary to obtain quasi-in-

to provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is not subject to the
jurisdiction of any state upon proper service of a summons. This excercise of jurisdiction must still
be consistent with constitutional standards and plaintiffs claim must arise under federal law. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The new rule allows a plaintiff to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant based on the totality of defendant's contacts with the United States. Previously, plaintiffs
were unable to maintain jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with any one state were
insufficient to assert jurisdiction under state law.
148. Banco Ambrosiano S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1984).
149. Id.at 434.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Banco Ambrosiano, 464 N.E.2d at 434.

154.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).

RECOVERING PROPERTY FROM OVERSEAS

rem jurisdiction will also generally support in personam jurisdiction, the
doctrine is still useful in New York. Because of an oddity in New York
law, where the Constitution allows a New York court to exercise in
personam jurisdiction but New York law does not, courts can use postThis was
Shaffer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to "fill that gap"."'
precisely what the New York Court of Appeals allowed the Italian bank
to do.
The issue confronting the New York Court of Appeals was whether
the presence, in New York, of the money the Italian bank loaned to the
Bahamian bank was enough to support quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the
Bahamian bank for the purpose of attaching the money. The court held
that it was. Specifically, the court reasoned that:
This is not a case in which property is coincidentally located within
the State's borders and forms the only relevant link to defendant,
rather, [defendant's] account with [its correspondent bank] is closely
related to plaintiffs claim. It is the very account through which
[defendant] effectuated the transaction at issue .... [The factors in
this case,-the relationship between the cause of action and the
property, the activities to be performed in New York under the
parties' agreement, and [defendant's] other ties with New
York-combine to render the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
appropriate in this case.56
This holding allows foreign plaintiffs to assert jurisdiction over
defendants in New York for the purpose of attaching assets when the
assets are related to the underlying cause of action. After assets have
been attached, plaintiffs can proceed with litigation, either here or
abroad, confident that if a plaintiff's verdict is rendered, funds will be
available to satisfy the judgment.
2. Attachments to Secure Assets for Satisfaction of a Foreign
Judgment.-Once a plaintiff's verdict has been rendered, in conjunction
with converting the foreign judgment to a New York judgment, plaintff
can attach defendant's New York assets pursuant to section 6201(5) of
the CPLR.'57 Such an attachment has the benefit of insuring that assets
will be available if a New York court recognizes the foreign judgment.
Since this attachment is made only after a foreign judgment has been
rendered, whereas most attachments are made on a pre-judgment basis,

155.
156.
157.

Banco Ambrosiano, 464 N.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 436.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

13

DICK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1995

an interesting issue arises as to what standard a court should use in
evaluating this type of attachment application.
This issue was recently addressed by a court in the Eastern District
Plaintiff, a Japanese corporation, obtained a
of New York.' 58
judgment against defendant, a New York corporation, in Japan. This
judgment was on appeal at the time plaintiff sought attachment of
defendant's New York assets. However, for the purpose of recognizing
the foreign judgment, the judgment in Japan was final.' 59
Plaintiff sought an order of attachment and argued that as a
judgment creditor it did not need to establish anything except that the
judgment remained unsatisfied.'" The court disagreed, but did not go
so far as to require plaintiff to meet the same requirements as a plaintiff
seeking a pre-judgment attachment.' 6 ' The court noted that attachment
is a drastic remedy and is only granted for the purposes of obtaining
jurisdiction or securing assets. 6 In this case, the court held that since
defendant was a New York resident, the only issue was whether the
Because defendant
attachment was necessary for security purposes."
presented substantial evidence that it had enough assets and revenue to
satisfy the Japanese judgment, and plaintiff offered no evidence to the
contrary, the court declined to confirm plaintiff's attachment. '6
Nonetheless, this case does not eliminate the usefulness of a section
6201(5) attachment. Notably, defendant in this case was a New York
resident with significant assets in the state. For foreign judgment
creditors not in such a situation, section 6201(5) remains an extremely
viable option. Indeed, this case lessens their burden by reducing the
standard necessary to sustain an attachment.
B. Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments
U.S. courts have long recognized judgments of foreign countries.
The adoption of approximately half of the states of the Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act [hereinafter Uniform
Act] 65 has codified this process. In New York, codification of the

158. Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. v. Emo-Trans., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
159. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (listing the factors considered by New York
courts in determining whether to recognize foreign judgments).
160. Nippon, 744 F. Supp. at 1218, 1234-36.
161. Id. at 1234-36.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1236.
165.

UNIF. FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, cited in AM. JUR.2D

DESK BOOK item 282. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. LAw § 5301 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (table
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Uniform Act in article 53. of the CPLR was intended less to liberalize the
process of recognizing foreign country judgments and more to increase
the recognition by foreign countries of judgments obtained in New
York." This long history is recognized by section 5307 of the CPLR,
which provides that article 53 does not prevent the court from
recognizing foreign country judgments in situations not covered by the
statute.'67
The process of obtaining recognition of a foreign country judgment
has many advantages in today's international business environment.
Namely, judgments obtained abroad can be given full effect whenever
assets are located in the United States. However, the recognition of
foreign judgments in New York, like any other provisions of law, is
subject to varying interpretations. The next part of this article outlines
the procedures for seeking recognition of a foreign judgment and some
of the more problematic issues this process entails."
Article 53 applies to "any foreign country judgment which is final,
conclusive, and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal
therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal."'" Such a judgment
must grant a sum of money, and cannot include "a judgment for taxes,
a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or
family matters."170
Assuming these conditions are established, "a
foreign judgment is enforceable by an action on the judgment, a motion
for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, or in a pending action by
counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense.""'7
The issues most frequently litigated in these motions turn on the
various grounds upon which a New York court can refuse to recognize
a foreign judgment. Section 5304 lists nine factors a court may consider
in deciding whether to recognize a foreign judgment."7

collecting cites and states that adopted the Act). It is important to consult the codification of the Act
in each state because variations exist.
166. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &R. LAw § 5301 (McKinney 1978) ("So liberal has New York case
law been in the recognition of the judgments of foreign nations that the occasion for the use of
Article 53 has been rare.").
167. Id. § 5307.
168. See generally Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Act, 100 A.L.R.3d 792 (1980).
169. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. LAW § 5302 (McKinney 1978).
170. Id. § 5301(b).
171. Id. § 5303.
172. Id. § 5304. Section 5304 provides:
(a) No recognition. A foreign county judgment is not conclusive if:
1. the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law;
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1. Jurisdiction.-Separatefrom the issue of whether the foreign
tribunal had jurisdiction over the defendant is the issue of whether a New
York court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Apparently, due to the
language that was used in codifying the Act, New York is unique in
having created this problem.173 In other states, a foreigi judgment is
converted into a state judgment without having to bring an action in
court. In these states, an application is made directly to the clerk of the
New York,
court and a separate proceeding is not required. 74
however, requires that an action be brought and thus raises the specter
of personal jurisdiction.
This problem has been resolved judicially, although by a lower
court in New York, so as to basically create the same rule the other
states adopted by codification.175 The solution chosen by the court
requires us to revisit the doctrine of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.'7 6
. The court first recognized that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a
foreign country judgment must establish some basis of jurisdiction over
the defendant.'77 In this case, plaintiff had obtained an ex parte order
of attachment over defendant's property.' 78 Apparently, the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer was not considered in this early
order because the court considered it in this case. It appeared that the
property attachment did not have the kind of contacts necessary to
support post-Shaffer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The court, however,
reasoned that Shaffer "did not entirely emasculate the use of quasi-in-rem

2.
(b) Other
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
grounds for non-recognition. A foreign country need not be recognized if:
the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
the judgment was obtained by fraud;
the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the
public policy of this state;
the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled
otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum in the trial of the action.

Id. § 5304.
173. Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, Jurisdiction to Enforce Foreign-Country
Judgments, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1990, at 3.
174. Id.
175. See Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978).
176. See supra notes 154-56.
177. Biel, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
178. Id.
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jurisdiction, and indicated that there were certain exceptions to the
general rule of unconstitutionality.' 79
One of these exceptions was for the enforcement of judgments
rendered in Other cases. The Court in Shaffer reasoned:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that
the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no
unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State
where the defendant has property, whether or not that State has
jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter. 'so

Since this language applies to the sister-state judgments, however, the
issue was whether it also applied to foreign country judgments. This
court held that it did and reasoned:
Without permitting the attachment and levy process as a basis for
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the plaintiff, seeking to enforce a
recognized foreign Country judgment, would be barred a forum
unless he could gain a basis for in personam jurisdiction. Justice and
fair play are not being served by permitting such a situation to
exist. "'1

In sum, a plaintiff with a foreign country judgment must obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant to enforce the foreign country judgment
in New York. The plaintiff, however, need only establish pre-Shaffer
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. That is, the plaintiff does not need to establish
a relationship between the assets, the forum and the litigation-mere
presence of assets is sufficient to support jurisdiction."8 This is to be
distinguished from post-Shaffer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which requires
minimum contacts, and is necessary to support an order of attachment
before judgment is obtained.
2. Grounds for Non-recognition.-Assumingjurisdiction over the
defendant is obtained, article 53 provides a number of grounds upon

179. Id. at 234.
180. Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36.
181. Biel, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 235. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. h (1987) ("[An action to enforce a judgment may usually
be brought whenever property of the defendant is found, without any necessary connection between
the underlying action and the property, or between the defendant and the forum.").
182. In addition to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, there are two other methods for obtaining
jurisdiction over a defendant. Personal jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant if the defendant
resides in the state in which the assets are located. Also, if a defendant is served while travelling
in a state, minimum conctacts do not need to be established. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990).
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which a court may, in its discretion, refuse to recognize a foreign
country judgment. 8 ' The next section of this article reviews some of
the decisions addressing these factors.
(a) Default Judgments.-Frequently,defendants forced to litigate
cases in foreign nations do not appear and default judgments are entered
against them. A default judgment in such a case is rarely of use to a
plaintiff since a reason for defendant's absence is often the defendant's
lack of contacts and property in the foreign state. The judgment creditor
is thereby forced to seek recognition of the foreign judgment in a place
where the defendant has assets. When these assets are located in the
United States, plaintiffs may face courts that are particularly concerned
with the potential inequities of recognizing a foreign default judgment.
For example, in a case decided in New York, defendant purchased
After plaintiff returned
an antique while on vacation in Vienna."
home to New York, defendant refused to pay plaintiff on grounds that
the value and age of the antique had been misrepresented.' 85 Two
years later, defendant was served in New York with process issued from
an Austrian Court." 6 When defendant did not appear, a default
judgment was entered against him, and plaintiff moved pursuant to article
53 to have the Austrian default judgment recognized by New York."8
The court declined to recognize the Austrian judgment. The court
reasoned:
While we are cognizant of the desirability of affording recognition to
foreign country judgments so that judgments obtained in our own
courts will receive reciprocally favorable treatment abroad, the nature
of defendant's solitary act in this case was so causal and incidental to
the foreign forum that it could not possibly serve as a jurisdictional
predicate sufficient to grant conclusive effect to the default judgment
sued upon."18
Such a result, however, is not inevitable. A default judgment from
Britain was upheld by a court in the Southern District of New York.'89

183. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
184. Siedler v. Jacobson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dept. 1976).
185. Id. at 834.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 833 (citing Falcon Manufacturing Ltd. v. Ames, 278 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1967)).
189. Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing default
judgment obtained against defendant in England); Porisini v. Petricca, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888 (4th Dept.
1982).
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Plaintiff, a Connecticut bank with offices in London, entered into a loan
agreement with a Liberian shipping corporation." 9' Defendant, a Dutch
national who lived in London at the time of the loan but who resided in
New York at the time of the New York litigation, personally guaranteed
the loan.' 9' As part of the guarantee agreement, defendant agreed to
appoint lawyers in England to accept service of process. The shipping
company defaulted on the loan, and plaintiff demanded that defendant
make payment." Defendant failed to do so." 9
Plaintiff served defendant's lawyers according to the terms of the
guarantee agreement." 9 However, defendant never paid his lawyers'
fees and the lawyers advised defendant that unless payment and
instructions were received, a default judgment would be entered against
the defendant. 95 Eventually, the lawyers took no action and a default
judgment was entered against the defendant.'"
Plaintiffs moved to have the judgment recognized under New York
law and defendant, on one of numerous grounds, argued that the
procedure used to obtain the default judgment was so unfair as to amount
to a denial of due process. The court disagreed, observing that "English
procedure comports with our own standards of due process.""
Furthermore, the court focused on the facts of this case and reasoned:
[Defendant] was given notice of the need to answer and had an
opportunity to do so. He chose not to and later failed to pursue the
proper procedures to attempt to have the judgment withdrawn or
reversed. [Defendant] may now regret those decisions but the fact
remains that the default judgment resulted from [defendant's] failure
to provide for his own defense despite notice of the consequences of
that failure and not from the denial of due process.' 9
The court also did not accept defendant's argument that his failure to
defend in this action was based on lack of funds."9 The court noted
that defendant could have sought an extension of time to arrange
alternative financing. In addition, the court observed that defendant was
not a "hapless worker threatened with the loss of his job[,]" but rather

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Colonial Bank, 550 F. Supp. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Colonial Bank, 550 F. Supp. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59 n.3.
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a "sophisticated businessman, 'well able to defend [his] interests in court,
as this litigation amply shows.'"2"
(b) Due Process.-In addition to raising a due process argument
against recognition of a default judgment, due process arguments can
also be made to challenge the merits of a foreign judgment. Such an
argument can be made on the basis of section 5304(a)(4), which allows
a court to decline to recognize foreign judgments because they are
"repugnant to the public policy" of a state.2"'
This issue was recently litigated in an interesting case in New
York.2" z Plaintiff, an Indian national, won a libel judgment England
against a news service." 3 A reporter for this news service had written
a story about plaintiff, which was distributed in India, the United
Kingdom, and New York.'
The story discussed plaintiffs alleged
role in a complicated scheme through which a Swedish arms company
paid kickbacks to gain a munitions contract with India.2 5 Plaintiff
attempted to enforce the English judgment in New York, but defendant
invoked section 5304(a)(4), arguing that recognition of the foreign
judgment would be repugnant to the public policy of New York because
of the First Amendment issues involved in the case. 2"
The court agreed with defendant that the judgment should not be
recognized. 2'
The court also noted that under English law, a libel
plaintiff is not required to prove that the statement was false, nor is the
plaintiff required to prove that a media defendant intentionally or
negligently ignored proper journalistic standards.'
Instead, the
defendant has the burden of proving that the statement was true and of
asserting that the applicable statutory defense. 2' In short, English law
places the burden of proof on the defendant whereas U.S. law places the
burden on the plaintiff.210
Given these differences, the court
concluded:

200.
201.
202.
1992).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Colonial Bank, 550 F. Supp. at 59 n.3.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. LAw § 5304(a)(4) (McKinney 1978).
See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Id. at 662.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id. at 663.
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It is true that England and the United States share many common law
principles of law. Nevertheless, a significant difference between the
two jurisdictions lies in England's lack of an equivalent to the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The protections to free speech
and the press embodied in that amendment would be seriously
jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments granted pursuant
to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered
the protection afforded the press by the U.S.
antithetical to
211
Constitution.
C. Summary
In the United States, almost half the states have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act. In New York,
recognition of foreign country judgments has a long history. In addition
to the jurisdictional issues in foreign judgment recognition litigation in
New York, plaintiffs may have to defend the process used to obtain the
judgment in the foreign tribunal and, in some instances, the substantive
foreign law upon which the judgment was obtained. Overall, however,
given the strong desire in New York to have foreign courts recognize
New York judgments, foreign judgments are frequently recognized by
the courts.
Accordingly, if the party who obtained a foreign judgment
concludes that the laws and judicial procedures of that nation are not
inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States, or of the
state in which the property sought is located, resort to these various
procedures would be worthwhile and may well prove to be profitable.

211.

Id. at 665.

